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Abstract
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are one of the major causes of con-
cerns for communication service providers. When an attack is highly sophisticated 
and no countermeasures are available directly, sharing hardware and defense capa-
bilities become a compelling alternative. Future network and service management 
can base its operations on equally distributed systems to neutralize highly distributed 
DDoS attacks. A cooperative defense allows for the combination of detection and 
mitigation capabilities, the reduction of overhead at a single point, and the block-
age of malicious traffic near its source. Main challenges impairing the widespread 
deployment of existing cooperative defense are: (a) high complexity of operation 
and coordination, (b) need for trusted and secure communications, (c) lack of incen-
tives for service providers to cooperate, and (d) determination on how operations of 
these systems are affected by different legislation, regions, and countries. The coop-
erative Blockchain Signaling System (BloSS) defines an effective and alternative 
solution for security management, especially cooperative defenses, by exploiting 
Blockchains (BC) and Software-Defined Networks (SDN) for sharing attack infor-
mation, an exchange of incentives, and tracking of reputation in a fully distributed 
and automated fashion. Therefore, BloSS was prototyped and evaluated through a 
global experiment, without the burden to maintain, design, and develop special reg-
istries and gossip protocols.
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1 Introduction
The technological evolution has built a digitally networked society, in which the 
Internet is an indispensable basis for interactions. As the number of connected 
devices (mobile and stationary) increases, the complexity of systems providing con-
tent for these devices and their communication network grew in a similar proportion 
in support of the rocketing volume of traffic [1]. As a consequence, complex distrib-
uted systems are subject to several types of failures and threats that can compromise 
critical infrastructures of societies [2].
Although a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) is a widely known attack type, 
it remains one of the significant causes of concerns for service providers [5]. As 
observed (cf. Fig. 1, left) the number of IoT (Internet-of-Things) devices is surpass-
ing the number of non-IoT devices, e.g., mobile phones, laptops, or computers. IoT 
devices, ranging from small sensors to home gateways, are a main target of mali-
cious software exploiting their vulnerabilities to infect thousands [1, 6]. This soft-
ware, termed malware, contains malicious code using resources of its host system to 
perform undesirable or malicious activities [7].
1.1  Botnets
Within a DDoS context, once a device is infected by malware, labelled as a Bot, 
it runs software, whose resources are unintentionally used to execute commands. 
A Botnet defines a system composed out of a cluster of Bots controlled by at 
least one attacker. Botnets take advantage of lacking security of IoT devices and 
are the primary basis for large-scale attacks (cf. Fig. 1, right). While in 2018 a 
DDoS attack was peaking 1.7 TBit/s in traffic volume on GitHub servers, the fre-
quency of DDoS attacks also increased more than 29.7% times between 2015 and 
2016 [8]. However, the 52% reduction in the number of large-scale attacks from 
Fig. 1  Number of IoT-connected devices (per Year) (left), registered large-scale DDoS attacks (accumu-
lated quarters/year) (right), based on [3, 4]
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2016 to 2017 did not denote a reduction in attacks itself. Akamai reported that the 
majority of attacks ranged between 250 Mbit/s and 1.25 Gbit/s in traffic volume. 
However, in 2018 there was an alarming increase in the number of large-scale 
attacks by 67.1% due to different Mirai variations and reflection attacks based on 
Memcached [8].
The most prominent botnet example is the Mirai botnet, which exploits default 
and weak security credentials to take control of hosts and spreads itself to other 
devices. Mirai marked the transition toward an era of super attacks, in which the 
traffic volume at the target system often surpasses 1 TBit/s [1]. The first appear-
ance of Mirai was in 2016, peaking 623  Gbit/s of traffic volume in an attack 
against Krebs Security. Th respective Web site’s hosting company Akamai had 
to shut down this site, because the defense during three days became too costly. 
So many devices were used such that attackers did not have to use a sophisticated 
strategy. Iin October 2016 the attack on DynDNS peaked 1.2  TBit/s, resulting 
in the unavailability of significant Internet platforms and services, e.g., Twitter, 
GitHub, PayPal, and Spotify, due to the rendering of their Domain Name System 
(DNS) servers being unavailable [6].
1.2  Toward Cooperative Defenses
Taking these scenarios into account as well as the evolution of DDoS attacks, it 
is crucial that defense mechanisms have to evolve to become more powerful, too. 
For that, cooperative defenses for communication service providers—operators in 
short—have been proposed to reduce the overhead at a single point of mitigation. 
Although centralized defenses are effective in detecting and taking action against 
these attacks, in case of large-scale DDoS attacks, they are largely overwhelmed 
by the massive traffic. Hence, due to the highly distributed nature of such attacks, 
future network and service management, especially security management opera-
tions will benefit as follows: 
1 Since DDoS attacks are largely distributed, security management approaches need 
to scale their defense capacity based on distributed approaches.
2 Operators can benefit from a cooperative decentralization, in which players 
coordinate themselves in pre-established trust alliances to exchange information 
required, as long as respective incentives exist to perform cooperative a DDoS 
attack mitigation.
3 Operations need to minimize hardware requirements such that cooperative defense 
mechanisms are based on state-of-the-art solutions, e.g., Software-defined Net-
working (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV), to manage network 
operations, security measures, and deploying service functions for the detection 
and mitigation of malicious traffic.
4 In addition, the use of Blockchains (BC) can increase trust among cooperative 
operators based on a transparent exchange of information, driven by incentives 
to deploy Virtual Network Functions (VNF) across SDNs.
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Cooperative defenses allow for the combination of detection and mitigation capa-
bilities of different domains, reduction of overhead at a single point, and blockage of 
malicious traffic near its source. However, since there is no widespread deployment 
of such a cooperative defense system yet main challenges [9, 10] remain: (a) the 
high complexity of operation and coordination, (b) the need for trusted and secure 
communications, (c) lack of incentives for the operators to cooperate, and (d) the 
understanding on how operations of these systems are affected by different legisla-
tion, regions, and countries.
1.3  Cooperative Blockchain Signaling System (BloSS)
The central goal of the cooperative Blockchain Signaling for DDoS (BloSS) is to 
provide a cooperative defense approach providing a technical answer for each of 
these categories combined into a single system. BloSS contributes to approaches and 
techniques to foster a collaborative defense between different Autonomous Systems 
(AS). while covering these four categories of challenges in an integrated manner. 
Furthermore, the analysis of legal, economic, and social requirements as well as 
the approach as an entire solution, embedded into a prototype, plays the key role to 
indicate the effectiveness of BloSS on a technical basis. Through an in-depth analy-
sis, where related work provides data on functionality, performance dimensions (cf. 
Sect. 2), it is observed that none of these approaches adopted in practice cover these 
challenges.
BloSS relies on BCs and Smart Contracts (SC) [11]. Due to approaches, such as 
CoFence [12] and Bohatei [13], it is possible to enforce rules decentrally via BCs 
and SCs in a flexible and scalable fashion—at no additional hardware costs or 
restrictions to instantiate the cooperative defense. BCs do foster trusted cooperation, 
because they not only operate on the principle of decentralization, helping to elimi-
nate third-party intermediaries, but they also provide incentives for stimulating the 
cooperative behavior among service providers. Similarly, BC capabilities allow for 
not only the mitigation of signaling requests, but also for an immutable platform for 
the exchange of mitigation services, where each participant can express their needs 
in forms of incentives.
While previous work by the authors presented the initial BloSS architecture of 
a collaborative defense based on BCs and SCs [14–16] being deployed as a local 
SDN cluster representing the underlying infrastructure (taking blacklisted address 
signaled and enforcing black-holing rules via OpenFlow), the extended BloSS design 
here includes mechanisms to ensure the provision of incentives for mitigation ser-
vices via SCs, while now assessing the reputation of operators involved actively. 
In addition, an evaluation of the reputation system within BloSS was performed 
considering different behavior for each participant [17]. For instance, interactions 
were mapped based on honest, malicious, lazy, and selfish players (e.g., targets—
the ones under attack—or mitigators—the ones offering collaborative mitigation). 
This assessment improved the final design of BloSS, including all on-chain steps 
for providing incentives and mapping reputation of members of such a collaborative 
defense, as well as front-end design presented in [18, 19].
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Another aspect of cooperative defense is concerned with the impact of the size of 
blacklisted address lists on latency for signaling [20]. This work verified the benefit 
of the establishment of an off-chain P2P network based on IPFS (Inter Planetary File 
System) [21], in which nodes are exclusive participants in the collaborative defense 
as for BloSS. In this study the impact of confidentiality of data being exchanged off-
chain was highlighted, impacting the design for a key exchange in the overall archi-
tecture (cf. security in Sect. 4.6).
This step is complemented in this work by the evaluation of performance aspects 
in a world-wide experiment, such as information propagation latency and proto-
col execution time. Therefore, in combination with the tracking and evaluation of 
reputation in a collaborative defense [17] and an off-chain transfer of blacklisted 
addresses [20] BloSS has reached herewith a practical and deployable approach for 
security management, especially in terms of DDoS mitigation in a cooperative, dis-
tributed manner.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. While Sect. 2 presents back-
ground and related work, Sect. 3 outlines the assumptions and requirements taken 
into consideration. Section  4 describes the cooperative logic implemented in SCs 
and the decentralized application based on SDNs. While evaluations are contained 
in Sects. 5, 6 draws conclusions.
2  Related Work
As a response to the increasing number of DDoS attacks, research sees an increasing 
number of proposals to counter DDoS attacks based on both centralized and dis-
tributed (cooperative) perspectives. While centralized proposals target the optimiza-
tion of detection and mitigation processes at a single domain, cooperative proposals 
broaden this scope by including mechanisms and protocols to perform the signaling 
of attacks between two or more domains, i.e., a gossip-based protocol and an archi-
tecture supporting its functioning.
As identified in [9, 10], main challenges of existing approaches are identified as: 
(a) the high complexity of operation and coordination; (b) the need for trusted and 
secure communication; (c) a lack of incentives for service providers to cooperate; 
and (d) the understanding on how operations of these systems are affected by differ-
ent legislation, regions, and countries. They are categorized:
– Technical: The Internet is a heterogeneous environment whose underlying 
infrastructure is composed of many different protocols, systems, and network-
ing equipment. The challenge is to abstract hardware/software differences of 
the underlying infrastructure or operate based on existing standards, avoiding to 
impose additional software or hardware requirements.
– Social: The public image of a service provider is often its most valuable asset. 
Thus, all the communication of such defense also needs a trusted channel to 
make sure that the attack information provided to all members is not only reli-
able, but also private to its members. Furthermore, trust needs to be established 
and reputation needs to be managed.
958 Journal of Network and Systems Management (2020) 28:953–989
1 3
– Economic: Solely relying on voluntary contributions creates a favorable envi-
ronment for free-riding (consuming resources without contributing). Incentives 
among the participating members need to be provided. Costs are in the form of 
CAPital EXpenditures (CAPEX) to configure and maintain the communication 
infrastructure as well as OPErating EXpenditures (OPEX) to cover resource uti-
lization costs for the actual attack mitigation.
– Legal: It is necessary to understand and react upon the differences in the legal 
aspects of each region or country, which can influence the cooperation among 
members. For example, for legal reasons a member may be prevented from 
blocking traffic of a suspected host.
Secure Overlay Services (SOS) [22], COSSACK [23], and DefCOM [24] paved the 
way for cooperative defenses in the early 2000s. While SOS focused on identifying 
legitimate sources for time-sensitive networks (i.e., requiring peers to authenticate 
to the overlay network), COSSACK and DefCOM based their approach on detec-
tion and enforcement points in access networks. However, these approaches required 
changes in routers [23, 24] or required sources to be registered [22], thus, showing 
complexity of coordination and operation.
Another typical, although non-cooperative approach is to use cloud-based protec-
tion services. These serve as a proxy receiving, analyzing, and redirecting traffic to 
the target, which delegate detection and mitigation tasks to the protection provider 
(e.g., Akamai [1] or CloudFlare [25]). However, despite having dedicated resources 
to mitigate DDoS attacks and relying on incentives to perform this service, these 
are still centralized approaches and, therefore, vulnerable to large-scale attacks as 
observed in the DynDNS attack [26].
Guangsen and Manish [27] applies a gossip-based communication protocol to 
exchange attack information between independent detection points to aggregate 
information about observed attacks. The system is built as a peer-to-peer overlay 
network to disseminate attack information rapidly to other listening users or sys-
tems. A similar approach as of [28] formalizes a gossip-based protocol to exchange 
information in an overlay network using intermediate network routers. Also, [29] 
deploys a similar architecture, but uses an advertising protocol based on the FLEX 
(FLow-based Event eXchange) format, which is used to simplify the integration and 
deployment of the solution and facilitates communication process between domains 
involved.
More recent approaches, such as CoFence [12] and Bohatei [13], are based on 
relatively new technologies. For example, NFV and SDN can reduce the complexity 
of coordination and operation and based on essentially software approaches, decou-
ple specific functions previously performed in hardware to a central point with a 
global view of the network as well as virtualize specific functions to be executed 
on servers. As a result, there is greater flexibility in the deployment and operation 
of these solutions, typically including the performance trade-off. Thus, the greater 
the level of abstraction or the generalization of the network function, the greater 
the loss of performance. In case of SDN, there is an issue of latency between the 
decision taken at the controller and the switches, and in case of VNF, the bottleneck 
can become the processing capacity of the server that typically accumulates various 
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functions. Similarly, [30] proposes a collaborative framework that allows the cus-
tomers to request DDoS mitigation from ASes. The proposal is based on an SDN 
controller implemented at customer side interfaced with the AS, which can change 
the label of the anomalous traffic and redirect them to security middle-boxes.
The implementation of Bohatei, for example, does not directly incorporate inter-
domain DDoS defense, which employing a scheme such as Pushback [31], would 
allow edge and access routers to relay traffic filtering to routers further upstream. 
Thus, expanding the approach for a multi-domain cooperative defense with the flex-
ibility of SDN and NFV. Pushback relies on a Aggregate-based Congestion Con-
trol (ACC) concept, in which ACC imposes a traffic shaping on subsets of traffic 
(i.e., aggregations) defined by some characteristics such as specific destination port 
or source Internet Protocol (IP) address. It is a router-based solution that allows a 
router to request adjacent upstream routers to rate-limit the specified aggregates, and 
prevents upstream bandwidth (i.e., outbound traffic) from being wasted on packets 
that are only going to be dropped downstream.
Further, many proposals for a cooperative defense are not only limited to the sign-
aling of attack information, offering a complete framework including attack detec-
tion, signaling, and mitigation. On the one hand, a complete solution has a positive 
side by offering the entire defense framework not only for the single domain but 
also in a cooperative fashion. On the other hand, this imposes hardware and soft-
ware requirements that may restrict the widespread adoption of the solution. As an 
example, the IETF DOTS [32] proposal has a complex architecture that can make its 
widespread adoption an issue. However, it also has a high power of standardization, 
which can facilitate the adoption of the Protocol in standard networking hardware.
Related work (cf. Table 1) addresses a collaborative defense schemes facilitating 
communications among peers. This can be achieved either by using a novel technol-
ogy (e.g., SDN and NFV) or a novel architecture, such as IETF DOTS [32] and Def-
COM [24]. DOTS shows the major advantage of engaging the industrial community 
(through IETF) in forming a standard protocol for exchanging information about 
attacks. In this sense, the social aspect can be addressed in the creation of communi-
ties of mutually trustworthy entities, however, following a client-server model for 
the exchange of information.
However, challenges as of economic and social nature are not fully addressed. 
Thus, a technical solution based on BC has to avoid additional costs regarding hard-
ware and software and needs to be simple to be deployed and operated. Therefore, 
BloSS encompasses the support for incentives based on BCs that can be safely and 
reliably distributed among participants and their legal/conformity options can be 
selected, too, e.g., restricting the operation to specific regions/countries or members.
Therefore, cooperative defenses can benefit from BCs in different dimensions. 
While BCs can (a) reduce the complexity of operations and coordination by using 
existing infrastructures to distribute rules without any specialized registries or 
protocols, they also can foster a (b) trusted cooperation due to their transparency 
and decentralized characteristics. Also, they can provide (c) financial incentives 
fostering the cooperative behavior among service providers [33]. Thus, BC capa-
bilities can be leveraged for signaling mitigation requests across a BC network in 
a similar approach as for DefCOM [24] and BCs serve as an immutable platform 
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for the exchange of mitigation services, where participants express their needs in 
forms of incentives.
3  BloSS Design Considerations
BloSS allows for the distribution of incentives to boost the cooperative behavior 
of participating entities and to track the reputation of operators involved. Thus, 
SCs are deployed in the underlying permissioned Ethereum [34] BC infrastruc-
ture [deploying a Proof-of-Authority (PoA) consensus mechanism] used to sig-
nal attacks over several domains, while at the same time managing incentives. 
E.g., a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) within the same 
region is able to establish a private network, which is transparent only for its 
cooperative members (i.e., the CSIRT consortium). The consortium-based BC 
deployed provides trust by definition, i.e., assuming that shared information on 
an attacks signalled will not be exposed externally. However, trust is the key, as 
it involves sharing of data between CSIRTs [35]. Thus, a BC-based solution can 
provide through its natural transparency a higher degree of transparency and trust 
between collaborative instances (Table 2).
Table 1  Comparison of related work
 = property provided;  = property provided partially; ✗ = property not provided
Related work Cooperative defense challenges Capabilities
Technical Social Economical Legal
DefCOM [24] ✗ ✗ Signaling
SOS [22] ✗ ✗ Signaling
COSSACK [23] ✗ ✗ Signaling
Mitigation
Zhang et al. [27] ✗ ✗ ✗ Signaling
Pushback [31] ✗ ✗ Signaling
Mitigation
Steinberger et al. [29] ✗ ✗ Signaling
Mitigation
Sahay et al. [30] ✗ ✗ Signaling
Mitigation
Velauthapillai et al. [28] ✗ ✗ Signaling
Mitigation
Bohatei [13] ✗ ✗ Signaling
Mitigation
CoFence [12] ✗ ✗ Signaling
Mitigation
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3.1  Performance—Block Size and Delay
A limiting factor in a BC-based cooperative defense is performance, that involves 
the relation between the block size and the propagation delay, i.e., latency. The BC 
throughput is defined as [36]:
Considering a blockSize of 1 MB and a propDelay of 10 s, the throughput would be 
of t 0.1 MB/s delivered in epochs defined by the block generation time. Similarly, a 
blockSize of 2 MB and a propDelay of 10 s would result in a twice better through-
put t 0.2 MB/s. In addition, it should be noted that increasing block size can also 
negatively influence propagation time, the larger the file size being transferred, the 
greater the transfer time (cf. Fig. 2).
The effects of an increasing block size on the propagation delay is shown in 




Table 2  Benefits and drawbacks of a BC-based collaborative platform in a cyber-security context
Dimension Benefits Drawbacks
Performance Relatively simple to deploy and operate Lack of performance in terms of transactions per 
second and storage capacity
Incentives Platform to distribute incentives Incentives may not be required by the CSIRT 
community
Trust Enhancement of trust through full 
transparency and decentralization
Excess of transparency may impair confidential-
ity
Fig. 2  Influence of block size on propagation delay [37]
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the propagation time through the delay cost, which is defined by the authors as the 
time delay each kilobyte causes to the propagation of a transaction or block [37]. As 
reported, for sizes below 20 kB the round trip delay caused by the Protocol (Bitcoin 
used as example) causes a major influence on delay, whereas in blocks larger than 
20 kB, each kilo byte represents an additional of 80 ms. The number of available 
blocks in a period of time can be determined by relation between the block gen-
eration time blockGenTime and the period of time T. Thus, considering a blockGen-
Time of 15 s based on the Ethereum, and a period of time in a day (in seconds) T 
= 86,400 s, the number of available blocks in a day is given by T/blockGenTime, 
resulting in this case in 5760 blocks. The maximum amount of information that can 
be Storage Available in the Period (SAP) is described by:
In the case of a blockSize of 1 MB, the SAP considering a blockGenTime of 15 s 
would be 5.76 GB of storage available in a day, and 11.52 GB for a 2 MB blockSize 
for the same blockGenTime. Another negative aspect observed in a BC solution is 
the need for storage of BC history. This is to ensure that data previously entered into 
the BC is verified by all members, and also to prevent modifications being made for 
any malicious purpose. Alternatively, it is possible to define times (e.g., monthly or 
yearly), in which organizations of the alliance can save the BC state into a snapshot 
(which needs to be hashed and compared by all members) and start a new fork of 
the same BC [38]. However, such an approach does not reduce by itself the need for 
storage, requiring snapshot compression and storage at a more efficient media.
3.2  Financial Incentives
The CSIRT community currently shares information based on trusted contacts [39], 
i.e., the exchange of information between CSIRTs works at the confidence level that 
is defined by each CSIRT’s individual relationship with other members in a region, 
group, or alliance. Currently, no exchange of financial incentives exists for shared 
information or cooperative mitigation actions.
The use of BC as a collaborative platform allows the creation of a marketplace 
to exchange mitigation services, financially rewarding actors involved in the mitiga-
tion of requests. While, to the best of the authors knowledge, there is no financial 
reward for these services (nor their needs explicitly evidenced by CSIRTs), there are 
proposals to formalize an incentive model associated with sharing, analyzing and 
delivering cybersecurity services [40]. There are arguments both for and against the 
use of financial incentives [39, 41]:
– Against: changing the current model of how information is shared could impact 
the trust model among CSIRTs.
– Favor: incentives could allow for greater engagement of collaborative organiza-
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The lack of financial incentives could discourage cooperation, which involves the 
use of resources and possible legal consequences of future mitigation acts in cases 
of false positives. The argument in favor is “a lot to lose and little to gain” [39] in 
effecting collaborative mitigation, and incentives are required to increase engage-
ment. Naturally, by requiring resources from third parties, financial incentives are 
the most effective way to cover these costs.
3.3  Blockchain as an Enabler of Trust
Trust is the fundamental aspect of any cooperative environment and difficult to 
obtain, since it may rely on many non-technical aspects [42]. Also, the process of 
building trust between entities has no relation to a specific technology and several 
non-technical and specific aspects of each organization are required. BCs operate as 
a “trust-enabler”, providing transparency and trust between cooperative organiza-
tions. However, it is not possible to quantify the role of BCs as a trust enabler, since 
it is not possible to determine a “probability” in which the use of BC is a determin-
ing factor in ensuring trust between organizations. The role of BCs in building trust 
has been studied by [43], in which solutions are addressed on how these conflicting 
notions may be solved, while exploring the potential of BCs for dissolving the trust 
problem. According to [44, 45], the main characteristics of trust are defined as:
– Dynamic: as it applies only in a given time period and maybe change as time 
goes by. For example, a history of security data sharing between two or more 
companies does not guarantee that these companies will always share data at any 
time. Trust can only be built during a time-frame.
– Context-dependent: the degree of trust on different contexts is significantly dif-
ferent. E.g., organization A may share threat indicators, but may not disclose 
actual malware intelligence due to, e.g., legal issues. Thus, trust may exist 
between organizations A and B only for sharing a “threat indicators” context.
– Non-transitive: if A trusts B and B trusts C, A may not trust C. However, A may 
trust any organization that B trusts in a given context.
– Asymmetric: trust is a non-mutual reciprocal in nature. That means if entity A 
trusts B, the statement entity B trusts entity A is not always true.
Among the various (non-technical) facets of trust, in the cooperative platform it 
plays a crucial role. This has been demonstrated in different e-commerce studies 
[46, 47], where online shoppers must necessarily rely on the functioning mechanism 
of the online store to make the purchase (i.e., use the credit card in a potentially 
unknown online store). These studies suggest to measure trust as the belief that a 
platform is honest, reliable, and competent.
Mapping these dimensions to BCs, a permissioned deployment model with a con-
sensus necessarily open to the participation of all members within the cooperative 
defense meets these requirements. The capability to create an immutable and pub-
licly (within this context) available record of transactions is seen as an enabler of 
trust [43]. In addition, the definition of rules between participants through SCs does 
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allow to verify the execution of the SC defining the cooperation. However, algorith-
mic trust is not limited to the correct functioning of the algorithm, but also includes 
a variety of socio-technical factors, such as its formal and legal correctness beyond 
the technical solution.
3.4  Truthfulness of Mitigation Proofs
After the acceptance of the service mitigation terms by both parties (T and M) and 
T send funds to be locked in the SC, a period begins in which M must send proof of 
service mitigation. At this stage, a technical challenge is the absence of guarantees 
that the service was performed as requested since it is performed outside the prem-
ises of T. This problem was detailed in a previous work [48] and this subsection 
presents an overview (cf. Fig.  3) on the challenge of verifying the quality of the 
mitigation service.
VNF Marketplace: Allows for a T to encapsulate mitigation actions as a software 
that can be directly deployed on commodity hardware running on M’s site. In such 
an approach, a marketplace for VNFs can be built for all entities involved in the 
cooperative defense. Then, a M loads the VNF certified by T directly from the mar-
ketplace to perform the mitigation service using a cookbook with negotiated on 
chain e.g., list of attacking addresses and a mitigation action. While this approach 
provides a high degree of isolation, it does not guarantee that M would not tamper 
with its execution environment. Solely deploying a VNF is not a reliable proof of 
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3  Approaches toward a verifiable mitigation proof [48]: a VNF marketplace, b trusted platform, c 
secure logging, and d network slicing
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mitigation and T still needs to trust that M will run untampered VNFs directly from 
the VNF marketplace.
Trusted Platform Module: A TPM allows to extend the chain of trust up to the VNF 
itself. In combination with a VNF marketplace, it is possible to provide a mitigation 
service in which VNF requests are always handled by known and trusted hardware. 
However, this approach imposes scalability concerns once TPM modules are a fea-
ture available only as a standalone chip or as a solution integrated into the mother-
board, but it does not come pre-installed on networking equipment. Still, it would 
not be possible to ensure the truthfulness of the mitigation once a malicious M 
would be able to change the network flow to the system running the mitigation VNF 
and lead it to believe that it is seeing all the traffic while in reality, parts or all of the 
attack traffic have been rerouted and no mitigation seems to be required anymore.
Secure Logging: Is the production of a log outputting the effect of a mitigation 
action, which can be leveraged by previous approaches, where a VNF certified by 
T and running on a TPM module does store logs inside a BC to ensure immutable 
evidences. However, similarly to previous approaches, it is still not possible to guar-
antee the truthfulness of a mitigation test, since underlying traffic flows can be tam-
pered before reaching VNFs required by T.
Network Slicing: An approach leveraged by SDN networks in which it is possible 
to virtualize network segments and allow T to install specific flows to perform the 
mitigation. Therefore, instead of allowing a virtual network function (whose source 
code may not be known by M), controlled access to the infrastructure (specified in 
the slice) is allowed to T. However, it is still possible that the slice provided by a 
malicious M is tampered with so that actions defined by T have no real effect on the 
underlying traffic.
4  BloSS Protocols Design and Application
The design of BloSS considers an on-chain part, where the cooperation logic is 
implemented in SCs, and an off-chain part, whose prototype was based on SDN to 
facilitate with the network management system signaling attacks and the implemen-
tation of mitigation actions. In addition, BloSS is based on am Ethereum Proof-of-
Authority (PoA) consensus, i.e., access to the overlay network is restricted to the 
alliance of cooperative members in certain countries or regions.
4.1  Incentives and Fairness
While providing many benefits, a cooperative defense also poses many challenges e.g., 
why often competing organizations would help each other. In a competitive environ-
ment, trust needs to be established. Solely relying on a voluntary contribution (i.e., 
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accepting defense requests) creates a favorable environment for free riding peers (con-
suming resources without contributing). This situation, and the social dilemma that the 
business partners find themselves in is illustrated in Fig. 4. First, the attack T publishes 
malicious IP addresses. Second, multiple Ms adjust the configuration of their network 
devices to filter and drop the malicious packets. In a third step, the attack T evaluates 
the effectiveness of the mitigation service.
A reputation scheme allows contributors and consumers of the network to rate enti-
ties that request protection in a cooperative defense. These systems have already been 
proven useful for e-commerce websites to incentivize peers to contribute with relevant 
information and establish fairness among peers. A basic scenario illustrating fairness 
problems in the DDoS mitigation process can be divided into three stages, as depicted 
in Table 3. Firstly, between the mitigation request by the DDoS attack target T and the 
actual blocking of the malicious IP addresses by a M domain M. Secondly, after the 
delivery of the mitigation service and the payment by domain T. Table  3 illustrates 
three possible mitigation histories and outcomes, depending on how T and M act.
Whenever a M submits a proof of mitigation, there is no automated way for other 
peers to build a consensus on the quality of the service delivered [48]. In other words, 
the receipt in a “payment-for-receipt” exchange process cannot be automatically issued 
by an SC, because in the worst case, any upload is accepted as successful delivery and 
the DDoS T domain would pay for a worthless receipt. Attack size and amount of pay-
ment are relevant factors that could result in severe financial losses for the attack T. In 
order to avoid this problem, the reputation process depends on the attack T to validate 
and rate the outcome of the mitigation service within an a priori agreed deadline.
Fig. 4  Social dilemma of false-reporting and free-riding in collaborative DDoS defenses [17]
Table 3  Cooperative defense 
scenarios with DDoS attack 
target T and mitigator M 
Stage 1. Request 2. Service 3. Payment
Behavior T requests M blocks T pays
T requests M blocks T refuses
T requests M refuses –
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It is reasonable to assume that T’s costs inflicted by the attack are higher than the 
costs of domain M, which is providing the mitigation service. A rational M would be 
better off not providing the costly mitigation service in the short term (i.e., betray). 
Also, T has strong incentives to refuse payment (i.e., betray). Since in a repeated game, 
the roles of T and M could be swapped, they are better cooperating in view of future 
attacks. A reputation and incentive scheme can incentivize the peers because it records 
and stores past behavior. This data can be analyzed by other peers before committing 
new transactions and can help them to make better decisions. The peers will preferably 
transact with reputable colleagues. This leads to an increase in successful transactions 
overall, i.e., it increases social welfare. The percentage of successful interactions can 
serve as a useful performance measure to evaluate a reputation and reward scheme [49].
Furthermore, reputation points used to rate T and M are preferably not the same, 
because a task owner with a good rating does not necessarily need to be a good 
M and vice-versa. Therefore, reputation earned as M is stored separately from the 
reputation earned as attack target or task owner. A simple metric gives the analyzing 
peers a clear understanding of a peers reputation. Added to this, a complex metric 
might lead to feedback loops. There are two types of reputation sources, subjective 
and objective. While the subjective reputation is composed of positive and negative 
ratings from other peers, the objective, historical metrics can be obtained from the 
public BC history. For example, the reputation system prototype in this thesis allows 
to compute the following metrics (among others):
– Customer age: The customer age can be derived from the block timestamp when 
the customer ID was created.
– Number of interactions: Completed tasks (negative, positive and unknown rat-
ing) and the number of interactions for a customer are obtained through the pub-
lic task states.
– Average satisfaction: The average satisfaction with a peer (ratio of positive and 
negative ratings) signals the general satisfaction with this customer.
– Number of completed tasks: Observing the amount of completed tasks over time 
helps to compare historical with current customer performance.
4.2  BloSS Cooperative Protocol
Figures 5 depicts possible states and transitions depending on the message sender 
(i.e., caller) of the function, including the rating of both, the mitigation service per-
formed by an M entity accepting a mitigation request and a T entity, the T of the 
attack.
After the deployment of the SC, the default state Request is set until the T requests 
defense from a M by initializing, which changes the state to Approve. The initializa-
tion contains important variables (e.g., network information, deadline interval, or 
minimal amount of funds), which are not changed during the following process until 
the SC is reused through initializing or re-initializing. During Approve, the chosen 
M may cooperatively accept or is uncooperative deny the request which either leads 
to the state Funding or the end-state Abort. The negotiation of SC parameters can 
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take place off-chain through a direct communication channel if needed. For exam-
ple, the Whisper protocol (Ethereum) could be used to agree on these SC param-
eters. This negotiation phase could as well be designed two-ways, allowing T to sub-
mit an actively “request for service” to M. Once the offer reaches T, the domain 
under attack can draft a valid mitigation SC.
While in the Abort state, the T may choose to initialize with a different M or 
re-initialize with the same M to reach Approve again. However, if the M is coop-
erative, the Funding state begins, and after sending the required incentives, the 
state switches to uploadProof and the funds are locked into the SC until com-
pletion. T writes the attack information (e.g., IP address ranges, packet captures, 
request headers, notes, and other patterns [20]) to the external off-chain storage 
(e.g., IPFS [21]). During the service time window (t0), M is supposed to upload 
a proof of service. M will have an incentive to submit a proof (even a forged one) 
since time works against M. T is obliged to validate the effectiveness of the ser-
vice and rate M during the validation time window. T will have the interest to vote 
and proceed in the mitigation process since the clock works against T during this 
time window.
Fig. 5  BloSS SC for a collaborative, on-chain DDoS signaling
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The M can upload proof in the form of a report that is used as evidence for 
work that has been done by the M to mitigate the DDoS attack. In the best-case 
scenario, both parties keep their promises and deliver money and service on time. 
The offers and SC proposals can be made repeatedly by the two domains until 
they find an agreement. During this process, M and T also agree on the deadlines 
for service delivery, validation, payment, and rating. Playing against the rules will 
result in a financial loss for both parties, as depicted in Fig. 6. For example, if T 
misses to acknowledge or reject the proof in response to the delivered service, M 
will be rewarded.
Fig. 6  Payout process: T is refunded, if no proof was uploaded and M is rewarded, if T does not validate 
in time
970 Journal of Network and Systems Management (2020) 28:953–989
1 3
Therefore, T is penalized and has no chance to retrieve the payment. Both parties 
are free to abort the protocol, if the counter-party did not deliver the result expected 
during the agreed time-frame. The decision flow that shows who gets rewarded on 
abort is visible in Fig. 6. If M did not deliver the service, T will retrieve the payment. 
Similarly, if T did not respond during the validation time window, M will be reim-
bursed. M is not allowed to rate, if no proof was uploaded. This ensures that a user’s 
reputation is only changed through valid interactions, which impedes bad-mouthing 
[50]. In order to bad-mouth a competing domain and deteriorate its reputation, the 
attacker needs to buy at least as many mitigation services from this competitor. This 
increases the competitors’ profit and is irrational [50]. In contrast to M, the process 
allows T to rate, even if no proof was uploaded during the service window.
However, even if the BC preserves a transparent audit trail for all transactions, 
it cannot compensate for lack of ground-truth. This holds for the uploaded proof of 
service as well as for user-defined, subjective ratings, in which there is no automated 
way to fully determine the truthfulness of a proof or rating. If the defined the dead-
line interval is missed, or there is no upload of a proof, the M is marked as lazy, and 
the updated state is Abort. If a proof is uploaded, the rating process of the T and the 
M begins. During rating, only the case where both actors are dissatisfied leads to the 
Escalate end-state in which the actors themselves must manually find a solution to 
find consensus upon the service and incentive. All other combinations of the T or M 
rating satisfied, selfish or dissatisfied, lead to the end-state Complete. When Com-
plete is reached, the locked funds from BloSS are released and transferred to either 
the T or the M, depending on missed deadlines and ratings.
4.3  Implementation
Storing participating Targets (T), Mitigators (M), and their respective addresses in a 
Register SC (i.e., a meeting point for participants of the collaborative defense), ena-
bles a search for Ms and an efficient management of active processes. This registry 
type SC extension is important to facilitate the process of finding a known M, which 
is already registered, waiting for a T to interact.
When M is not be found in the Register, the default address value is received by T 
and further searching for a specific M can be done. However, in case the required M 
is found, T addresses can be observed by M in order to interact with the SC itself. At 
this point, an SC has stored the address of T and M in order to either allow or disal-
low access to functionality or a change of SC states.
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Retrieving an M (i.e., retrieving an M from the Register SC) requires to know 
its identifier by the Target T. If the identifier and the M address exist without hav-
ing an SC address assigned to the same struct, the address of this SC is assigned 
and registered and that M address is returned to the SC instance. A protocol is 
created by associating addresses of T with M in a verifiable on-chain SC. Ena-
bling both Register and BloSS SCs to interact, offers advantages, such as calling 
methods or retrieving information from each other. The logic in the SC can be 
separated from the registration process. Thus, a single deployment of a Register 
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is needed whereas many SCs can be created, allowing every T to deploy BloSS 
and search for an M in the Register.
By storing these pairs of addresses in an efficiently verifiable data structure, a 
mapping allows for a usable client-side implementation, where only one instantia-
tion of BloSS is needed for the interaction between the T and the M and one key 
with which a search on the map can be done. And because the instantiation of the 
protocol references the same SC on both sides, the storage, states, and fields are the 
same as well, and the interaction on the BloSS may proceed. In order for a client to 
access the BloSS instance the Application Binary Interface (ABI) and the address of 
the BloSS is required.
Listing 1 summarizes main functions in the BloSS SC, which maps initial steps of 
the SC initialization, such as setting funds and deadlines to complete the mitigation 
service (e.g., methods init and approval). Thus, the execution of the SC prevents one 
to return states before the SC reaches its final stage (completion). For instance, it is 
not possible for an M to send another mitigation proof after the proof rating by the 
T (e.g., each method verifies the previous state with the require statement). Another 
important aspect of the BloSS SC is the rating by T and M (cf. Listing 2).
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Rating actions in Listing 2 consider both, rational and irrational behavior from M 
and T. Whereas a rational action means that one of the two parties acts as expected 
(best scenario) within the possible protocol alternatives, an irrational action means 
that either party loses a deadline or acts maliciously. The rating is the last step before 
completing the protocol, in which the call returns another function to complete the 
protocol, e.g., endProcess().
4.4  Discussion of Scenarios
At scenarios 1 and 2 T is dissatisfied as a result of M not uploading a proof, leading 
to funds being refunded to T. Even without a reply from T, T is refunded (cf. sce-
nario 2). To remove the possibility of ballot stuffing, where T would rate satisfied in 
case no proof being uploaded, T is not allowed to rate positively here. However, if 
a proof is uploaded before the service deadline ends, T can rate satisfied, be selfish, 
or dissatisfied. M can always react and rate rational, be selfish, or irrational, which 
enables further possibilities, although only three ending states can be reached after 
locking the funds.
Scenario 3 shows T rating satisfied and M reacts rationally with a positive rating, 
leading to funds being transferred to M. Similarly, scenarios 4 to 8 of T rating satis-
fied or being selfish (i.e., missing the service deadline) lead to M being rewarded, 
regardless of the rating by M. Case T is dissatisfied with the proof uploaded by M 
and M reacts in a rational way by rating dissatisfied as well (cf. scenario 9). The case 
escalates and further investigations are needed for resolving it. Scenarios 10 and 11 
lead to T being refunded due to rating dissatisfied and M being selfish or rating irra-
tionally satisfied.
4.5  Decentralized BloSS Application
An overview of the BloSS Decentralized Application (dAPP) is provided in Fig. 7 
detailing connections between all its modules. The BloSS is the component where 
each service provider taking part in the cooperative defense, can post information 
about an ongoing attack to the Ethereum, i.e., the connector to the on-chain con-
tracts. It uses a REST interface to facilitate the isolation of the BloSSmodule, encap-
sulating the entire module together with Pollen BC and Pollen data store as SDN 
applications and, possibly, as a VNF running on commodity hardware. The goal of 
this design is not to impose restrictions on the underlying networking hardware, fur-
ther simplifying the interaction with the BloSS and its modules via REST interfaces.
Data exchange is accomplished with the “Pollen” set of modules, and the “Stalk” 
module handles network-related tasks. Pollen is divided into dedicated modules 
for the specific data exchange duties of the BloSS, which includes a BC module for 
access to the Ethereum, a data storage module managing information on the IPFS. 
Attack information posted to the BC is not directly stored on the BC due to limited 
block sizes and to maintain the information confidential. For this purpose, IPFS is 
used as a decentralized and highly scalable storage solution to hold attack informa-
tion. Each service provider running the BloSS also maintains an IPFS node to enable 
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the decentralized storage. Whenever a new set of attack information is posted to the 
BC, the data is first stored in IPFS, and only the hash as a unique identifier of the 
storage location within IPFS is stored in a block on the Ethereum.
The Pollen data store also includes an encryption component. The encryption of 
attack information posted to IPFS ensures the confidentiality and the integrity of the 
attack information based on a per-message signature bundled with the attack infor-
mation. Confidentiality is an essential attribute of the data exchange between ser-
vice providers, since the attack information can be sensitive in regards to implicating 
individuals both as victims of an ongoing DDoS attack or as perpetrators of said 
attack.
Verifying the integrity of attack information allows for holding each service pro-
vider accountable for the information posted to the BC and makes forgery of attack 
information impossible. The integrity-check is enabled through a public key pub-
lished by each service provider to the BC and, therefore, available to all providers 
participating in the BloSS defense alliance. Without this measure, forgery of attack 
information would allow a malevolent party to indicate specific IP addresses as 
being the source of an ongoing attack and to block flows from these addresses to the 
T address specified in the attack information.
4.6  Security Considerations
Figure 8 shows a prototypical defense scenario involving an M as well as T’s AS. 
Attack detection is outside the scope of the BloSS so the first step includes compiling 
Fig. 7  Architecture of the blockchain signaling system (BloSS)
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the attack information and encrypting it to later store to IPFS and post the IPFS hash 
to the Ethereum. To minimize access to IPFS as well as Ethereum to access attack 
information and the public key of T’s AS, the attack information hash is connected 
to a Boolean indicating whether the information has already been accessed by M’s 
AS in order to block the attackers. However, incentive schemes necessary to real-
ize a true Mitigation-as-a-Service (MaaS) offering as outlined in [48] are out of the 
scope of this implementation of BloSS.
Encryption and decryption is built with the Python Cryptography library [51] 
and the choices for cryptographic algorithms as well as key lengths and other cryp-
tographic details are based on an article by Colin Percival [52]. PollenEncryption 
uses both asymmetric cryptography through RSA with 2048 bit keys and symmetric 
cryptography through Fernet, which is essentially the Advanced Encryption Stand-
ard (AES) block cipher in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode using a 128 bit key 
[51].
Asymmetric encryption is used for two tasks in PollenEncryption: To encrypt the 
symmetric key as well as to cryptographically sign the unencrypted attack report 
with the private key of the sender. Signing the attack report with the private key 
allows the receiver to verify the authenticity of the attack report by using the public 
key available on the BC for cryptographic verification. Instead of directly encrypt-
ing the attack report through asymmetric encryption, the symmetric Fernet scheme 
is used. Asymmetric encryption is very useful since no secret key exchange has to 
occur, however it is not well suited to encrypt large amounts of data since the size of 
data to be encrypted cannot exceed the key size of 2048 bit [52] (Fig. 9).
After encrypting the attack report and symmetric key as well as signing the attack 
report, all three components, signature, encrypted symmetric key and encrypted 
attack report are stored in IPFS as a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) object for 
Fig. 8  BloSS defense scenario including a T and an M AS
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easier handling through the Stalk and BloSS REST APIs. In addition to encrypting 
each set of attack information when posted to IPFS, all communication between the 
Pollen datastore module and IPFS is encrypted with the libp2p-secio [53] stream 
security transport, which is based on TLS 1.2. Transport encryption would not be 
strictly necessary since the data being transported is already encrypted, however this 
allows a certain degree of anonymization for the defense system users since it is 
not possible to ascertain which AS accessed which attack information when sim-
ply looking at the communication between IPFS and AS. This added anonymity can 
also be seen as an additional factor contributing towards increased confidentiality.
Communications between individual Ethereum nodes is also encrypted as 
detailed in the DEVp2p [34], which contributes to an increased confidentiality. 
However, due to the distributed ledger characteristics of Ethereum, transactions can 
be traced back to the party responsible for the chain. The last part of the commu-
nication chain with the REST interface between BloSS and Stalk is not encrypted. 
This is by design since the REST interface is designed to only be accessible on the 
same machine to allow for simple communication between BloSS and Stalk while 
enabling a high degree of encapsulation for the BloSS module in order to allow the 
implementation of Proof-of-Mitigation schemes.
5  Experimental Evaluations
The goal of an experimental evaluation is to measure quantifiable parameters, 
such as the gas usage and the performance. Based on those outcomes and within 
a global evaluation, it is possible to label BloSS a feasible approach. However, to 
Fig. 9  Encryption Procedure for Off-chain Data Transfer via IPFS
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achieve a global BloSS deployment, a simulation based on Truffle and Ganache 
Suite and a local deployment on a test net was performed. Since Truffle and 
Ganache are simulation environments, they allow for a verification of the correct-
ness of SCs running on Ethereum. Since previous results from local deployments 
on hardware were published in [33], this evaluation discloses the global evalua-
tion results.
Hardware Setup: BloSS’ evaluation was based on Amazon Web Service (AWS) 
instances deployed in Ohio, Tokyo, and São Paulo. These EC2 Amazon t2 medium 
instances were configured with two threads on either an Intel Xeon or an AMD 
EPYC-Core running at up to 3.0 GHz and with 4 GByte of RAM. All instances 
were synchronized with the Ethereum Rinkeby BC in order to enable separation 
of the Target T and Mitigator M. Each location was tested separately between the 
target in Zürich and São Paulo and the mitigator set to Ohio and Tokyo, respec-
tively. Table 4 lists Round Trip Time (RTT) results executed on AWS instances in 
Zurich, São Paulo, Tokyo and Ohio. RTT times can be used to evaluate, whether 
a potential statistical significance across RTT may be found during execution of 
BloSS.
Software Setup: A synchronized BloSS node utilizes Geth to interact with a SC 
deployed. Instead of relying on one full node offered by Infura with two accounts, 
the BloSS tests with the Geth client are executed on two synchronized nodes in 
Zürich and Ohio to measure the gas usage and the performance.
To rectify the problem of non “full” block times, a synchronization process 
before the actual registration or signaling process can be completed. By synchro-
nizing the measured time-frame closer to the beginning of the starting block, i.e., 
maximizing x, global results become comparable to results on a previously con-
figured local Rinkeby. A second approach to retrieve the correct time measure-
ment on the global performance tests was to run tests n = 20 times, such that 
the first run acts as a synchronization step. Thus, depending on the scenario and 
the deadlines missed, full block times represent the worst case in terms of BloSS 
performance.
By running the target script on an AWS instance in Ohio and a M script on a 
node located in Zürich (both synchronized to the Rinkeby network), the average 
global Rinkeby processing time with n = 20 is 96.950 s and the average standard 
deviation is 1.146 s (cf. Table 5). Since the control condition has been tested and 
Table 4  Average RTT between 
nodes (ms)
From To
Tokyo São Paulo Ohio Zürich
Tokyo – 270 159 223
São Paulo 270 – 130 130
Ohio 159 130 – 119
Zürich 276 223 119 –
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evaluated as well, similar results in terms of average processing time and average 
standard deviation are expected. However, similar results were reached as shown 
in Tables 5 and 6, while the nodes were not synchronized at all times due to time-
outs, i.e., missed deadlines. This is due to the full nodes, which are geographi-
cally in close proximity of the AWS instances in Tokyo and São Paulo, but not 
being synchronized at all times [54].
For both global averages, average times measured show a similar result, 
with a slight difference in the average processing time of 0.668  s representing 
the difference of approximately 0.7%. By reaching these similar results in both 
global Rinkeby tests and removing the corresponding RTT shown in Table 4 the 
Table 5  BloSS global Rinkeby 
processing times (s) (Zürich-
Ohio)















Table 6  BloSS control condition 
processing times (s) (Tokyo-São 
Paulo)
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difference in average processing times for the scenarios is only 0.5171 s. It should 
be noted that 20 test runs per case may not lead to exact average values. Also, 
every test on the global Rinkeby network was tested with varying (not precise) 
average block times of 15 s.
Average Gas Cost: The Gas used in the global Rinkeby tests show slight differ-
ences compared to Ganache and local Rinkeby tests, which were all based on the 
Table 7  BloSS global Rinkeby 
gas use (Gwei)
Scenario Total gas T gas used M gas used
Deployment 3,795,264 3,795,264 –
1 253,999 192,836 61,163
2 253,999 193,236 61,163
3 314,438 169,225 145,213
4 314,490 169,225 145,265
5 315,050 169,225 145,825
6 314,370 168,928 145,442
7 314,508 168,928 145,580
8 315,154 168,928 146,226
9 291,401 169,139 122,262
10 314,716 169,139 145,577
11 315,362 169,139 146,223
Average 301,626 173,450 128,176
Fig. 10  Comparison of global average times on ganache and localRinkeby
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same truffle test scripts. While the registration gas usage does not differ in any 
test, the total BloSS gas used on average differs at 15,366 Gwei compared to local 
Rinkeby and Ganache. All global Rinkeby gas used results are shown in Table 7.
Figure 10 depicts overall average times to complete the execution of BloSS for 
the three infrastructures and eleven scenarios, where each scenario had n = 20 
test runs. In total, 660 scenarios were executed to assess the worst-case time to 
complete the execution of BloSS. Similar processing times were observed as in 
local and simulated deployments, and it could be shown that by using Infura as a 
proxy, the behavior of the public test net Rinkeby with a simulated actor in Ohio 
could be mimicked. This implies that the performance of BloSS is stable and can 
be accessed in a similar way through the Truffle framework and the Geth client. 
Even the controlling condition, where actors are located in São Paulo and Tokyo, 
showed similar results, when both nodes were synchronized. Thus, the confidence 
in the cooperative signaling is enhanced.
The overall gas used to deploy and utilize the Register SC is the same, whereas 
BloSS shows slight differences. On average an M needs to pay gas costs ranging 
from 0.04 US$ for the gas price of 1 Gwei to 0.8 US$, when prioritizing transac-
tions with a gas price of 20 Gwei. A T is required to pay more gas on average, 
which ranges from 0.06  US$ to 1.13  US$. However, the deployment of BloSS 
must be paid for as well and one-time costs for a deployment of BloSS range 
from 0.82  US$ to 16.40  US$. Thus, the total costs to deploy both SCs require 
a payment from 1.03  US$ to 20.51  US$ (cf. Table  8 with a conversion rate of 
216.00 US$/Ether).
6  Discussions and Conclusions
DDoS defense mechanisms see an increasing number of cooperative approaches. 
The DOTS architecture by the IETF is a prominent proposal built on top of a 
gossip-protocol crafted for DDoS defense signaling [32]. Other approaches, such 
as DefCOM, are based on lightweight overlay networks to enable signaling in a 
peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion [24]. Therefore, BloSS is more akin to DefCOM, since 
it builds on Ethereum instead of developing new communications from scratch. 
By leveraging the distributed nature of BCs, BloSS scales to the demand of mod-
ern distributed DDoS defense systems. Conversely, DefCOM relies on complex 
Table 8  Total average global 
Rinkeby costs in US$ per BloSS 
instance
Deployment Target Mitigator
Register (Gwei) 952,459 88,866 56,343
BloSS [Gwei] 3,795,264 173,450 128,176
Total Gas Used (Gwe) 4,747,723 262,316 184,519
Total Costs max. (US$) 20.51 1.13 0.80
Total Costs min. (US$) 1.03 0.06 0.04
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P2P message exchanges, which are more prone to failure within distributed set-
tings than a BC consensus mechanism as BloSS deploys.
6.1  Robustness of the Reputation System
By analyzing the design of the cooperative protocol it is possible to make an analysis 
of different types of possible fraud. An evaluation with customers M and T with dif-
ferent profiles (e.g., honest, malicious, lazy, and others) is performed in the authors’ 
previous work [17]. Table 9 summarizes the analysis, which is followed by a discus-
sion on each type of fraud.
Free-riding: This type of activity is prevented by design in BloSS by requiring T’s to 
deposit the incentive required by M’s into the SC. Since the SC is designed as a state 
machine, it is not possible to circumvent this step making the mitigation service start 
before funds are locked into the SC.
False-reporting: Fraud can happen when a malicious M assigns a false rate to an 
honest T at the end of the interaction. Although the protocol allows for this, no 
rational incentive exists, since actions are recorded on the BC. Thus, future interac-
tions of a malicious M can be tracked by all T’s.
Sybil- and Collusion Attacks: BloSS excludes the possibility where a customer can 
boost its reputation by creating mitigation SCs with itself. A possible deployment 
on a public ledger would enable actors, i.e., a M or T, to maintain multiple account 
pseudonyms on the BC and transacting between them to inflate reputation (Sybil 
attack). Therefore, it would be necessary to implement within the BloSS SCs an 
access control mechanism to prevent whitewashing or re-entry attacks on reputation 
systems.
Ballot Stuffing: BloSS is not immune against ballot stuffing. Besides transactions 
recorded on the BC, customers can agree on discounts and benefits over alternative 
communication channels. For instance, two malicious T and M would be able rate 
each other positively independently from the mitigation outcome in rounds where 
both can perform the role of T and M.
Bad-mouthing: A BC-based reputation system design impedes bad-mouthing in 
which a T or M can only provide feedback for transactions completed. This elevates 
costs of bad-mouthing a competitor, since a transaction has to be committed for each 
fraudulent reputation statement.
6.2  Discussion of Achievements
Overall, the technical, social, economic, and legal aspects of BloSS have been 



































Table 9  Assessment of reputation frauds
=property ; =property partially provided; ✗ = property not provided
Target Fraud Short description Achieved
System Free-riding Incentives are required to request mitigation services
False-reporting M is not incentivized to provide false-reports on T but the protocol allows such behavior, which can be tracked 
on future interactions
Rating Sybil and collusion Whitewashing (re-entry) of identities is not prevent in a permissionless deployment
Ballot stuffing Malicious M’s and T’s can collude to elevate their reputation ✗
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large-scale attacks, such as the Memcached attack on GitHub servers surpassing 
1.35 TBit/s [8] and DynDNS which peaked 1.2 TB/s resulting in the unavailabil-
ity of significant Internet services [6]. In such cases, traditional centralized defenses 
can be easily overloaded, and cooperation between organizations is useful to lessen 
the impact of attacks. Hence, BloSS addresses different challenges of a coopera-
tive defense such as providing incentives and tracking reputations among members. 
This not only encourages participation, but also punishes malicious behavior by 
members.
Technical: By designing the BloSS dApp with SDN and NFV-capabilities the key 
advantage of a quick deployment was engineered into BloSS, inherent to competing 
systems like CoFence [12] or Bohatei [13]. However, due to BloSS’ modular archi-
tecture, it is neither limited to SDN-based networking infrastructures nor limited to 
an NFV-based solution. On the contrary, the networking module of BloSS termed 
Stalk can be adapted to various infrastructure deployments, while still maintaining 
connectivity over the RESTful interface to BloSS modules.
Social: Reputation and reward schemes integrated into BloSS prevent free-riding 
(attack targets) and false-reporting (mitigators). These mechanisms incentivize the 
rational behavior of operators in the long run. Selfish members are identified by 
looking at their past interactions on the BC. Furthermore, the payment of rewards 
provides a highly suitable countermeasure to dis-incentivize selfish customers. Miti-
gators are incentivized to execute the final service rating step, since otherwise they 
would deprive themselves of payments. In addition, it is possible to create circles by 
connecting different BloSS instances through interoperability between blockchains. 
This could be achieved employing a Notary-based agnostic solution such as [55, 56].
Economic: As incentives already stipulate social behavior, by providing a platform 
to exchange incentives, BloSS creates a new scenario for mitigation defenses [17]. 
By extending cloud-based protection services, a decentralized marketplace for pro-
tection services based on BCs is foreseen. In such a model it will be possible for 
members to create strategic regional alliances and use a portion of their infrastruc-
ture to perform mitigation services. Therefore, in combination with recommender 
services [57] as selection of a suitable protection provider based on specified 
requirements can optimize costs.
Legal: Legal and regulatory aspects are often intertwined. In addition to the possi-
bility of creating circles of trust, which depends on the social requirements, multiple 
BloSS networks can be defined for national or regional circles of trust, respectively. 
Also, such circles make it possible to discriminate selection criteria based on the 
legal settings of each operator, possibly restricting the participation or interaction 
with certain regions or operators.
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6.3  Conclusions
BloSS contributes to the modern security management for DDoS mitigation 
approaches with a cooperative defense logic and prototype as a proof-of-concept 
(available in [33]). It enables a flexible and efficient DDoS mitigation solution 
across multiple domains based on a permissioned PoA Ethereum [34], in which only 
pre-selected operators participate in the cooperative defense. Therefore, based on 
recently validated technical tools, such as BCs and SDNs, it became possible to pro-
vide a practically deployable, collaborative defense mechanism capable of overcom-
ing the main challenges as stated above and in [9, 10].
The BC-based approach does not only enable the cooperative signaling of attacks, 
but also provides for an immutable and transparent platform allowing for incentives 
to be exchanged for mitigation services as well as tracking reputation. BloSS man-
ages network operations and deploys service functions for the detection and mitiga-
tion of malicious traffic. The definition of contracts, especially SCs, stipulates the 
cooperative logic based on BCs and allows for the increase of trust among coopera-
tive operators due to their transparent exchange of selected information and respec-
tive incentives on a per request basis.
Furthermore, execution times and costs of BloSS as presented are based on the 
worst-case scenario, i.e., a public BC infrastructure. For example, Target and Miti-
gators were configured to react to requests close to the deadlines configured in the 
contract. Therefore, it has to be noted that a PoA-based deployment of BloSS will 
reach a much lower, almost neglectable cost basis and an even further reduced 
block creation time. This was shown for the case of simulated and local Rinkeby 
deployments.
Overall, the main achievement and advantages reached with the design and pro-
totypical implementation as well as the evaluation of BloSS include (a) the use of 
an existing public and distributed infrastructure, the BC, to flare white- or black-
listed IP addresses and to distribute incentives related to the mitigation activities 
requested. Furthermore, it provides a proof-of-concept for (b) a cooperative, opera-
tional, and efficient decentralization of DDoS mitigation services, and (c) a compat-
ibility of BloSS with existing networking infrastructures, such as SDN and BC.
6.4  Future Work
Based on an even further increase in traffic and the frequency of DDoS attacks, it 
is expected that future network and service management operations will also have 
to encounter alternatives equally distributed. While existing cooperative approaches 
present operational challenges, future work for BloSS involves the analysis of how 
actors (especially targets and mitigators) (a) would interact based on different pro-
files (e.g., with malicious or honest properties) and (b) are impacted by different 
incentive values required to perform a mitigation service and, thus, simulating 
a DDoS protection market. Also, instead of storing raw names and strings in the 
BloSS register, hashes of data or even hashes of the storage address could be per-
sisted within the BC, since transparency has to be taken into account. Based on 
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those mechanisms ratings of the mitigator or the target the BloSS register can be 
extended, too, to enable a ranking and to separate positively rated actors from nega-
tively rated ones.
Acknowledgements This paper was supported partially by (a) the University of Zürich UZH, Switzer-
land and (b) the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program under Grant Agree-
ment No. 830927, the CONCORDIA Project.
Funding Open access funding provided by University of Zurich.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen 
ses/by/4.0/.
References
 1. Akamai. How to protect against ddos attacks—stop denial of service
 2. Felici, M., Wainwright, N., Cavallini, S., Bisogni, F.: What’s new in the economics of cybersecu-
rity? IEEE Secur. Privacy 14, 11–13 (2016)
 3. IoTAnalytics. State of the IoT 2018: number of IoT devices now at 7B—Market accelerating, Fev 
(2018)
 4. Akamai. The state of the internet (2020)
 5. Maglaras, L., Kim, K.H., Janicke, H., Ferrag, M.A.,Rallis, S., Fragkou, P., Maglaras, A., Cruz, T.J.: 
Cyber security of critical infrastructures, vol. 4. ICT Express,, SI: CI and Smart Grid Cyber Secu-
rity, pp. 42–45, (2018)
 6. The Associated Press. Hackers Used ’Internet of Things’ Devices to Cause Friday’s Massive DDoS 
Cyberattack (2016)
 7. Gu, G., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., Stoll, J., Lee, W.: Active botnet probing to identify obscure 
command and control channels. In: 2009 annual computer security applications conference, pp. 
241–253. IEEE, New York (2009)
 8. Kotey, S.D., Tchao, E.T., Gadze, J.D.: On distributed denial of service current defense schemes. 
Technologies 7(1), 19–25 (2019)
 9. Zargar, S.T., Joshi, J., Tipper, D.: A survey of defense mechanisms against distributed denial of ser-
vice (DDoS) flooding attacks. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutor. 15(4), 2046–2069 (2013)
 10. Peng, T., Leckie, C., Ramamohanarao, K.: Survey of network-based defense mechanisms countering 
the DoS and DDoS problems. ACM Comput. Surv. CSUR 39(1), 03–15 (2007)
 11. Bocek, T., Stiller, B.: Smart contracts-blockchains in the wings. Digital marketplaces unleashed, pp. 
169–184. Springer, Berlin (2018)
 12. Rashidi, B., Fung, C.: CoFence: a collaborative ddos defence using network function virtualization. 
In: 12th international conference on network and service management (CNSM 16) (2016)
 13. Fayaz, S., Tobioka, Y., Sekar, V., Bailey, M.: Bohatei: flexible and elastic DDoS defense. In: 24th 
USENIX security symposium (USENIX Security 15), pp. 817–832 (2015)
 14. Rodrigues, B., Bocek, T., Lareida, A., Hausheer, D., Rafati, S., Stiller, B.: A blockchain-based archi-
tecture for collaborative DDoS mitigation with smart contracts. In: IFIP international conference on 
autonomous infrastructure, management, and security (AIMS 2017). Lecture notes in computer sci-
ence, vol. 10356, pp. 16–29. Springer, Zurich (2017)
986 Journal of Network and Systems Management (2020) 28:953–989
1 3
 15. Rodrigues, B., Bocek, T., Stiller, B.: Enabling a cooperative, multi-domain DDoS defense by a 
blockchain signaling system (BloSS). In: Demonstration track, pp. 1–3, Singapore, IEEE, Singapore 
(2017)
 16. Rodrigues, B., Trendafilov, S., Scheid, E.J., Stiller, B.: SC-FLARE: cooperative DDoS signaling-
based on smart contracts. In: IEEE international conference on blockchain and cryptocurrency 
(ICBC 2020), pp. 1–3, IEEE, Toronto, (2020)
 17. Gruhler, A., Rodrigues, B., Stiller, B.: A reputation scheme for a blockchain-based network coop-
erative defense. In: 2019 IFIP/IEEE symposium on integrated network and service management (IM 
2019), pp. 71–79, Washington, United States of America (USA) (2019)
 18. Killer, C., Rodrigues, B., Stiller, B.: Security management and visualization in a blockchain-based 
collaborative defense. In: 2019 IEEE international conference on blockchain and cryptocurrency 
(ICBC), pp. 108–111. IEEE, New York (2019)
 19. Killer, C., Rodrigues, B., Stiller, B.: Threat management dashboard for a blockchain collaborative 
defense. In: 2019 IEEE globecom workshops (GC Wkshps), pp. 1–6. IEEE, New York (2019)
 20. Rodrigues, B., Eisenring, L., Scheid, E., Bocek, T., Stiller, B.: Evaluating a blockchain-based coop-
erative defense. In: 2019 IFIP/IEEE symposium on integrated network and service management (IM 
2019), pp. 533–538, Washington, United States of America (USA) (2019)
 21. Benet, J.: IPFS-content addressed, versioned, P2P file system. arXiv preprint arXiv :1407.3561 
(2014)
 22. Keromytis, A., Misra, V., Rubenstein, D.: SOS: secure overlay services. ACM SIGCOMM Comput. 
Commun. Rev. 32(4), 61–72 (2002)
 23. Papadopoulos, C., Lindell, R., Mehringer, J., Hussain, A., Govindan, R.: COSSACK: coordinated 
suppression of simultaneous attacks. In: Proceedings DARPA information survivability conference 
and exposition, vol. 1, pp. 2–13. IEEE, New York (2003)
 24. Oikonomou, G., Mirkovic, J., Reiher, P., Robinson, M.: A framework for a collaborative DDoS 
defense. In: 2006 22nd annual computer security applications conference (ACSAC’06), pp. 33–42. 
IEEE, New York (2006)
 25. CloudFare. CloudFlare advanced DDoS protection (2016)
 26. Khalimonenko, A., Kupreev, O., Badovskaya, E.: DDoS attacks in Q1 2018. https ://secur elist .com/
ddos-repor t-in-q1-2018/85373 /, April 2018. last visit March 6 (2020)
 27. Zhang, G., Parashar, M.: Cooperative defence against DDoS attacks. J. Res. Pract. Inf. Technol. 
38(1), 69–84 (2006)
 28. Velauthapillai, T., Harwood, A., Karunasekera, S.: Global detection of flooding-based DDoS attacks 
using a cooperative overlay network. In: 2010 4th international conference on network and system 
security (NSS), pp. 357–364. IEEE, New York (2010)
 29. Steinberger, J., Kuhnert, B., Sperotto, A., Baier, H., Pras, A.: Collaborative DDoS defense using 
flow-based security event information. In: NOMS 2016–2016 IEEE/IFIP network operations and 
management symposium, pp. 516–522 (2016)
 30. Sahay, R., Blanc, G., Zhang, Z., Debar, H.: Towards autonomic DDoS mitigation using software 
defined networking. In SENT 2015: NDSS workshop on security of emerging networking technolo-
gies. Internet society (2015)
 31. Ioannidis, J., Bellovin, S.M.: Implementing PushBack: router-based defense against DDoS attacks 
(2002)
 32. Mortensen, A., Andreasen, F., Reddy, T., Gray, C., Compton, R., Teague, N.: Distributed-denial-
of-service open threat signaling (DOTS) architecture. Internet-draft draft-ietf-dots-architecture-06, 
internet engineering task force. Work in Progress (2018)
 33. Rodrigues, B., Stiller, B.: Cooperative signaling of DDoS attacks in a blockchain-based network. In: 
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2019 conference posters and demos, SIGCOMM Posters and 
Demos ’19, pp. 39–41, ACM, New York (2019)
 34. Wood, G.: Ethereum: a secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger. Ethereum Project Yel-
low Paper 151, 1–32 (2014)
 35. Bada, M.: Sadie Creese. Chris Mitchell, and Elizabeth Phillips. Improving the Effectiveness of 
CSIRTs, Michael Goldsmith (2014)
 36. Croman, K., Decker, C., Eyal, I., Gencer, A.E., Juels, A., Kosba, A., Miller, A., Saxena, P., Shi, E., 
Sirer, E.: On scaling decentralized blockchains. In: International conference on financial cryptogra-
phy and data security, pp. 106–125. Springer, Berlin (2016)
 37. Decker, C., Wattenhofer, R.: Information propagation in the bitcoin network. In: IEEE P2P 2013 
proceedings, pp. 1–10. IEEE, New York (2013)
987
1 3
Journal of Network and Systems Management (2020) 28:953–989 
 38. Zheng, Z., Xie, S., Dai, H.N., Chen, X., Wang, H.: Blockchain challenges and opportunities: a sur-
vey. Int. J. Web Grid Serv. 14(4), 352–375 (2018)
 39. Skierka, I., Morgus, R., Hohmann, M., Maurer, T.: CSIRT basics for policy-makers. Types & cul-
ture of computer security incident response teams, the history (2015)
 40. PolySwarm. A decentralized cyber threat intelligence market (2019)
 41. Just, S., Premraj, R., Zimmermann, T.: Towards the next generation of bug tracking systems. In: 
2008 IEEE symposium on visual languages and human-centric computing, pp. 82–85. IEEE, New 
York (2008)
 42. Henshel, D., Cains, M., Hoffman, B., Kelley, T.: Trust as a human factor in holistic cyber security 
risk assessment. Procedia Manuf. 3, 1117–1124 (2015)
 43. Hawlitschek, F., Notheisen, B., Teubner, T.: The limits of trust-free systems: a literature review on 
blockchain technology and trust in the sharing economy. Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. 29, 50–63 
(2018)
 44. Um, T.W., Lee, G.M., Choi, J.K.: Strengthening trust in the future social-cyber-physical infrastruc-
ture: an ITU-T perspective. IEEE Commun. Mag. 54, 36–42 (2016)
 45. Pranata, I., Skinner, G., Athauda, R.: A holistic review on trust and reputation management systems 
for digital environments. Int. J. Comput. Inf. Technol. 1, 44–53 (2012)
 46. Kim, J., Yoon, Y., Zo, H.: Why people participate in the sharing economy: a social exchange per-
spective. In: PACIS, pp. 76 (2015)
 47. Yaobin, L., Zhao, L., Wang, B.: From virtual community members to C2C E-commerce buyers: 
trust in virtual communities and its effect on consumers’ purchase Intention. Electron. Commer. 
Res. Appl. 9(4), 346–360 (2010)
 48. Stephan, M., Bruno, R., Eder, S., Salil, K., Burkhard, S.: Toward mitigation-as-a-service in coop-
erative network defenses. In 2018 IEEE 4th international conference on big data intelligence and 
computing and cyber science and technology congress (CyberSciTech 2018), pp. 362–367, Athens, 
Greece (2018)
 49. Yao, W. Julita, V.: Trust and reputation model in peer-to-peer networks. In: Proceedings third inter-
national conference on peer-to-peer computing (P2P2003), pp. 150–157, 00604 (2003)
 50. Cai, Y., Zhu, D.: Fraud detections for online businesses: a perspective from blockchain technology. 
Fin Innov 2(1), 20 (2016)
 51. Cryptography developers. Python cryptography library. https ://crypt ograp hy.io/en/lates t/ (2017). 
Accessed 28 July 2018
 52. Percival, C.: Cryptographic right answers. http://www.daemo nolog y.net/blog/2009-06-11-crypt 
ograp hic-right -answe rs.html (2009). Accessed 28 July 2018
 53. Protocol Labs. IPFS stream security transport (libp2p-secio). https ://githu b.com/libp2 p/go-libp2 
p-secio (2018). Accessed 29 July 2018
 54. Rinkeby. Rinkeby testnetwork, voluntarely listed full nodes (2019)
 55. Scheid, E., Rodrigues, B., Stiller, B.: Toward a policy-based blockchain agnostic framework. In: 
IFIP/IEEE symposium on integrated network and service management (IM 2019), pp. 609–613, 
Washington, DC, USA (2019)
 56. Scheid, E., Hegnauer, T., Rodrigues, B., Stiller, B.: Bifröst: a modular blockchain interoperability 
API. In: IEEE conference on local computer networks (LCN 2019), pp. 332–339, Osnabrück, Ger-
many (2019)
 57. Franco, M., Rodrigues, B., Stiller, B.: MENTOR: the design and evaluation of a protection services 
recommender system. In: 2019 15th international conference on network and service management 
(CNSM), pp. 1–7 (2019)
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
Bruno Rodrigues is a Junior Researcher and PhD student in Informatics currently pursuing his PhD 
degree at the University of Zürich UZH, Switzerland, within the Communication Systems Group CSG 
of the Department of Informatics IfI under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Burkhard Stiller. He received 
his MSc from the Polytechnic School of University of São Paulo, Brazil, in 2016, where he worked on 
research projects in partnership with Ericsson Research focused on network management based on SDN 
988 Journal of Network and Systems Management (2020) 28:953–989
1 3
and energy efficiency. Bruno focuses his research on collaborative network defenses based on Blockchain, 
working on research projects like CONCORDIA in the scope of cybersecurity and PasWITS.
Eder Scheid is a Junior Researcher pursuing his PhD since December 2017 under the supervision of Prof. 
Dr. Burkhard Stiller at the University of Zürich UZH, Switzerland, within the Communication Systems 
Group CSG of the Department of Informatics IfI. Eder holds an MSc degree in Computer Science from 
the Federal University of the Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Brazil, which he obtained in 2017 under the 
supervision of Prof. Dr. Lisandro Zambenedetti Granville. His master’s thesis was entitled “INSpIRE: an 
Integrated NFV-baSed. Intent Refinement Environment”.
Christian Killer joined the Communication Systems Group CSG, Department of Informatics IfI at the 
University of Zürich UZH, Switzerland, in February 2019 as a Junior Researcher and PhD student in 
Informatics to obtain his PhD degree under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Burkhard Stiller. He finished 
his MSc Degree in Informatics at the University of Zürich UZH, focusing on Security Management and 
Visualization in a Blockchain-based Collaborative Defense. During his Master Studies he also completed 
a Master Project on “Provotum–Privacy, Verifiability, and Auditability in Blockchain-based E-Voting”. 
Christian focuses his research on the security of electoral processes and blockchain-based remote elec-
tronic voting systems.
Muriel Franco is a Junior Researcher and PhD student in Informatics under the supervision of Prof. Dr. 
Burkhard Stiller at the University of Zürich UZH, Switzerland, within the Communication Systems 
Group CSG of the Department of Informatics IfI. Since September 2018 Muriel is working in Zürich on 
cybersecurity, economics, blockchains, Software-defined Networking (SDN), and Network Function Vir-
tualization (NFV), participating and driving the work of the CONCORDIA project within a team of net-
working, security, and economic researchers. Besides that, from 2017 to 2020, Muriel developed jointly 
a federated ecosystem for offering, distributing, and execution of Virtual Network Functions (FENDE 
project). Muriel holds an MSc from 2017 in Computer Science from the Federal University of the Rio 
Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Brazil, under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Lisandro Zambenedetti Granville and 
obtained a BSc from 2014 in Computer Science from the Federal University of Pelotas (UFPEL), Brazil.
Burkhard Stiller received the Informatik-Diplom (MSc) in Computer Science and the Dr. rer.-nat. (PhD) 
degree from the University of Karlsruhe, Germany, in 1990 and 1994, respectively. In his research career 
he was with the Computer Lab, University of Cambridge, U.K. (1994–1995), ETH Zürich, Switzerland 
(1995–2004), and the University of Federal Armed Forces Munich, Germany (2002–2004). Since 2004 
he chairs the Communication Systems Group CSG, Department of Informatics IfI, University of Zürich 
UZH, Switzerland. Besides being a member of the editorial board of the IEEE Transactions on Network 
and Service Management, Springer’s Journal of Network and Systems Management, and the KICS’ Jour-
nal of Communications and Networks, Burkhard is the past Editor-in-Chief of Elsevier’s Computer Net-
works journal. His main research interests are published in well over 300 research papers and include 
systems with a fully decentralized control (Blockchains, clouds, peer-to-peer), network and service man-
agement (economic management), Internet-of-Things (security of constrained devices, LoRa), and tel-
ecommunication economics (charging and accounting).
Affiliations
Bruno Rodrigues1  · Eder Scheid1 · Christian Killer1 · Muriel Franco1 · 
Burkhard Stiller1
 Eder Scheid 
 scheid@ifi.uzh.ch
 Christian Killer 
 killer@ifi.uzh.ch




Journal of Network and Systems Management (2020) 28:953–989 
 Burkhard Stiller 
 stiller@ifi.uzh.ch
1 Communication Systems Group CSG, Department of Informatics IfI, University of Zürich 
UZH, Binzmühlestrasse 14, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland
